War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Henry Rowen, 1986
Description:
Henry Rowen was the president of RAND Corporation from 1967-1972, and Chairman of the National Intelligence Council from 1981-1983. He begins by recalling the main focuses of interest at RAND in the 1950s, including the development of ideas on nuclear strategy such as first and second strikes, early warning systems, and the concept of vulnerability. He discusses the U.S. policy for defending Europe, developed during the Eisenhower administration, and the latter's reliance on nuclear weapons (later rejected due to the growth of the Soviets' own nuclear capability). He recalls Kennedy administration concerns including the Berlin crisis and the approach the U.S. adopted of mounting displays of military force in hopes of inducing the Soviets to back down. If that approach were to fail, he acknowledges, "our options weren't too good." He describes the evolution of the principle of creating choices for deploying nuclear weapons in order to preserve their effectiveness as a deterrent. The Europeans, he recalls, did not react positively to Robert McNamara's Ann Arbor and Athens speeches on this topic, prompting attempts to allay their concerns. He notes that while the rhetoric from McNamara changed in the 1960s, basic instructions to the military did not. He regrets the change in McNamara's thinking toward assured destruction, and discusses other aspects of McNamara's revised conceptions of nuclear strategy. He asserts that the total destructive power of the U.S. arsenal reached its peak in the 1950s and has been declining steadily, in part due to the increased accuracy of weapons systems. He goes on to discuss topics such as the idea that if one side boosts its arsenal the other will inevitably follow, and describes how his thinking about deterrence, first-use and other issues evolved over the years.