War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with George Rathjens, 1986
Description:
George Rathjens was a member of President Eisenhower's scientific staff under Science Adviser George Kistiakowsky. In the interview he discusses the U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) for nuclear war in the late 1950s, touching on the inter-service rivalries in the weapons arena that existed at the time. He describes the Eisenhower White House's investigation into SAC's nuclear strategy, including SAC's thinking about a first strike capability and the expected levels of destruction from a U.S. attack on Soviet targets. In one instance, using a Hiroshima-sized target city in the USSR for comparison, Dr. Rathjens discovered that the plan called for weapons wielding several hundred times the power of the Hiroshima bomb. He notes that the guidance for the level of destruction was set at around 90 percent, which SAC took as a minimum, and set its own levels at 97 percent. He adds that SAC maintained both military and urban industrial targets. He explains the inflexibility of SAC's targeting, and therefore of the SIOP as a whole, and describes the hypothetical effects of the SIOP, which could destroy at least 75 percent of the Soviet Union, and would have major fallout affecting China and Eastern Europe. He recalls reporting to the president on his findings about SAC's plans, and further remembers that Eisenhower was visibly upset and voiced specific reservations about SAC commander Powell. Yet, to Dr. Rathjens' surprise, the president apparently did nothing to address the situation. He does acknowledge that SAC's guidance came from the Joint Staff.
