War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Thomas Moorer, 1986
Description:
Adm. Thomas Moorer was Chief of Naval Operations from 1967-1970 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970-1974. Much of the interview deals with SALT I and associated issues. He begins by offering his views of the impact of the Soviets' attaining essential nuclear parity and of Nixon's intentions to enter into an era of negotiation with Moscow. His main concerns at the time related to ABM issues. His primary objectives for SALT were to retain equality; deal with ABM matters; and limit Soviet offensive systems. He strongly advocated developing an ABM system for the U.S. and opposed giving up MIRVs. As a military man, he believes it is in American interests to negotiate. The interview then goes into detail about the SALT negotiations, including his concerns about SLBM numbers. He recalls telling President Nixon that he would support the treaty under three conditions - that the U.S. build the B1 bomber and the Trident missile, and guarantee adequate verification procedures. He recalls Senator Henry Jackson's proposed amendment and his insistence on personnel changes after SALT I. While he objects to members of Congress influencing personnel decisions in that way, he acknowledges that Nixon's need for Jackson's support gave him that power. The discussion moves to the role of nuclear weapons; his belief in the need to continue to improve and upgrade American arsenals; and the purpose of arms negotiations. He comments on Nixon's possible political motivations in setting the timing of negotiations with Moscow in 1972. He lists the effects of SALT I on America's military posture and his concerns about SALT II. In his opinion, detente is an acceptable concept as long as the Soviets keep up their obligations.
