Colonel-General N.F. Chervov was a senior member of the Soviet General Staffs arms control directorate. He begins by assessing the significance of the MX and its fit in the SALT process. It was undoubtedly a first-strike weapon, in his opinion, but he acknowledges that it was a response to the SS-18, which he describes as essentially the same missile. He prefers returning to single-warhead missiles because of their positive effect on stability. He discusses the question of first-use, insisting the USSR will never take the initiative to strike with nuclear weapons, then explaining the military planning implications of this stance. In his judgment, the Cuban missile crisis was the turning point in Soviet thinking about the disutility of nuclear weapons. He gives a lengthy recitation on the complicated issues surrounding the Euromissile crisis and discusses Soviet thinking about various negotiations. He attributes Moscows about-face on the zero option from 1981 to 1985 to new thinking in the Kremlin and a reassessment of the strategic balance. SDI, in his view, was a vain undertaking, and he partially deflects a question about Soviet anti-satellite research by blaming misinformation for distorting Western perceptions. He closes by pointing to a number of contradictions in U.S.-Soviet relations.
