Roswell Gilpatric was the Deputy Secretary of Defense 1961-1964. In this interview he describes various aspects of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 from the point of view of the Department of Defense. He starts by describing U.S. attempts as covert actions to take down Castro before the crisis. He offers the opinion that the U.S. is not very good at dirty tricks. He goes on to provide recollections of the crisis, such as being informed of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, and attending a lunch meeting with Secretary McNamara at which the two sketched out a war-game on the back of an envelope and concluded that a blockade of Soviet shipping was the best option. Mr. Gilpatric also describes President Kennedys planning process, particularly the difficulty of dealing with General Curtis LeMay, who was set on attacking Cuba. He describes other tensions over command and control between Secretary McNamara and Admiral George Anderson, who was in charge of naval operations. Despite the frictions, Mr. Gilpatric never believed the military would seriously defy civilian authority. As far as lessons from the crisis, he concludes that having the presidents trusted advisors brainstorm before including the president was the best way to provide him with a well-reasoned assessment.
![Interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 1986 [2]](https://bpldcassets.blob.core.windows.net/derivatives/metadata/commonwealth-oai:1j92j666f/image_thumbnail_300.jpg)
![War and Peace in the Nuclear Age; Interview with Roswell Gilpatric, 1986 [2]](https://bpldcassets.blob.core.windows.net/derivatives/metadata/commonwealth-oai:1z40q766j/image_thumbnail_300.jpg)
