Harold Brown was Director of Defense Research and Engineering from 1961-1965 and the Secretary of Defense from 1977-1981. In the interview he first discusses early reactions within the Air Force, and particularly by Gen. LeMay, to the notion of phasing out bombers and bringing in missiles. He also provides recollections of briefing President Kennedy on the Nike anti-aircraft system. Most of the interview focuses on nuclear strategy. He describes Robert McNamaras effort to change US strategy to one that targeted military facilities exclusively. He then discusses the issue that arose subsequently of how to limit damage in the event deterrence fails and nuclear war ensues. He goes into detail about the thinking behind damage limitation studies in the early 1960s, which postulated reducing casualties from 80-100 million to 60 million. McNamara, he recalls, concluded it would be better to focus on decreasing the likelihood of war than on attempting to effect casualty reductions that were essentially meaningless. Dr. Brown then delves into the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction and the thinking behind McNamaras Ann Arbor speech in 1962 on city avoidance policy. Other topics include the SIOP and the difficulties of making changes to it, or creating options as McNamara wanted; the notion that the US moves too slowly with changes to its strategic system; the rationale behind MIRVs; and some of the myths of MAD.
![Interview with Robert McNamara, 1986 [2]](https://bpldcassets.blob.core.windows.net/derivatives/metadata/commonwealth-oai:08614m274/image_thumbnail_300.jpg)
