Interview with Robert Bowie, 1986

Item Information

Title:
Interview with Robert Bowie, 1986
Description:
Robert Bowie was the Chairman of the Policy Planning Staff, U.S. State Department, from 1953-1957. In the interview he describes the evolution of NATO and U.S. defense strategy in the 1950s and early 1960s. His discussion of U.S. policy focuses in part on what came to be known as the “New Look,” introduced in 1953. He also discusses the consideration to use nuclear weapons to defend a Europe that the Europeans couldn’t and the Americans wouldn’t defend with conventional forces. He describes Secretary of State Dulles’ speech on massive retaliation policy in January 1954. That policy, he says, was never intended for local wars, like Korea or Vietnam, nor was it as simple as most people think now, incorporating both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons to provide mobility and flexibility in devising responses to Soviet aggression. He offers background to Eisenhower’s thinking on strategy, including his determination not to involve American troops in another land war in Asia. On a related point, he expresses doubt that Dulles ever offered to the French to use nuclear weapons at Dien Bien Phu. His discussion of NATO policy starts in 1950, when European NATO members insisted on having American troops deployed in Europe to serve as a stronger deterrent than just the promise of troops should Europe need them. The credibility of the American deterrent is another topic Mr. Bowie deals with in the interview, including the Norstad proposal for a NATO nuclear force. In addition, he comments on the subject of deploying tactical nuclear weapons for defense of the continent. He also discusses at length the Multilateral Force (MLF) plan, which was formulated in 1960, in an attempt to solve the problem of Europe’s dependence on and lack of control over U.S. military strength. This approach helped to mitigate the German sense of being treated as second-class in comparison to the British and French, who were developing their own national nuclear forces. The MLF did have the drawback of requiring the absolute consensus of all NATO nations for any retaliatory action. Mr. Bowie adds that the plan was essentially derailed when Secretary of Defense McNamara canceled the Skybolt missile program between the U.S. and British, which led to President Kennedy’s offer of Polaris missiles as a replacement, ultimately giving the British a stronger national capability but also undermining the MLF concept.
Interviewee:
Bowie, Robert R. (Robert Richardson), 1909-
Date:
December 12, 1986
Format:
Film/Video
Location:
WGBH
Collection (local):
WGBH Open Vault
Series:
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age
Subjects:
Great Britain
Polaris (Missile)
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Nuclear weapons
Massive retaliation (Nuclear strategy)
Multilateral force (Nuclear strategy)
Geneva Conference (1954)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Radford, Arthur William
German rearmament
Thorneycroft, Peter
International relations
United States. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Korean War, 1950-1953
Soviet Union
Dulles, John Foster, 1888-1959
Herter, Christian Archibald, 1895-1966
Gaulle, Charles de, 1890-1970
McNamara, Robert S., 1916-2009
Norstad, Lauris, 1907-1988
Macmillan, Harold, 1894-1986
Acheson, Dean, 1893-1971
Eisenhower, Dwight D. (Dwight David), 1890-1969
Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917-1963
Dien Bien Phu, Battle of, Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam, 1954
Places:
District of Columbia > Washington
France
Germany
Extent:
00:51:22:20
Link to Item:
https://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/V_542CFBDA69FB40E98CF8D5DE60938016
Terms of Use:
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Publisher:
WGBH Educational Foundation
Identifier:
V_542CFBDA69FB40E98CF8D5DE60938016